communist system, while Christians either reUnquished their religious identities altogether or stood in defiant opposition to communist rule? Ironically, part of the answer lies in the fact that Islam has no theological tradition which separates church antl state. In addition, economic and political circnmstances made Soviet comnmnistn more attractive to many Muslim ehtes. In the end, the stnjng political aspirations of Islam actually made it possible, as Emest Gellner states, "to simultaneonsly affirm an ancient identity and justify a strenuously Leap Forward."3
This essay examines the interaction of Islam and So\iet communism throudi a historical analysis of religious persistence in the five Soviet Republics of central ' Asia-Kiizakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This study uncovers tiie socio-political circumstances and the unique theologic-al characteristics of Islam which made it mdleable to Soviet conununisni. Islam's ability to adapt is important to note in a world in which cun'ent events have painted Muslims as predominantly obstinate and confrontational.
BACKGROUND HISTORY AND BASIC CONCEPTS
The histoiy of We.steni Europe provides many interesting examples of competition f)etween religious and secular ideas. Instances of" counter-religions doctrines cropped up din-ing the "Age of Enlightenment" when rationalists proposed that human reason alone, witiiont divine revelation, leads to an accurate understanding of not only the physical world bnt iUso morality and justice. Nevertheless, secnlar and religious ideologies are often quite copasetic. For instance, an individual can easily believe in Keynesiaii economics while also being a devoted Christian, reflecting Weber's insight into how religious and secular worldviews are often compatible and can borrow from one another to produce compatible systems of belief. This compatibility is the result of defining the domain of a secular ideolog)* in snuh a way that it does not overlap uitli a religions doctrine, ln fact, some historians hold that religion was most successful in Western Enrope after religious and secular doctrines became the specialties of separate institutions. Peter Raedts persnasivelv argues tliat A new era iur Christianity' in Europe-hegiiii ulien .ifter 1800 the churc-hes graduiUly lost support ofthe state and had to organize themselves. And it WAR not until dien that the new mass media and the schooling of all the population made the chHstianization of everyone a realitv.'* Stniggles between religions and political doctrines in Western Europe eventually gave rise to a separation of church and state.
Arrixiil of Soviet communism in the early twentieth century dramatically changed church-state relations witliin the territories whicli fell under its influence. C^onunnnism was tmicine becanse it was the first political ideology that was not only anti-clerical but also advocated a raaical atbeistic worldview.^ As expUuned by Isaiab Berlin:
What in fact was created by Marx was a new ecumeiiic;il orgauiziition, a kind of aiitiGhurch, witli a full apparatus of concepts and categories, capable, at Ieiist in theor>', of yielding clear and final answers to all possible qiiestions, private and public, scientific and historical, nioriil and aesthetic, individuiil and iiistitutioniil.Â s sucii, communist ideology could not accept the continued inflnence of religion even as an independent institutional entity. Lenin demanded tliat conunimist propaganda must employ militancy and irreconcilability towards al! ibrEns of idealism and religion. And that means that mtiteri<ilism organically readies that consequence imd perfection wliidi in the language of philosnpliy is called--militant atlun.sm. '' Militant atheism became central to the ideolog)' of the Communist Party and "a high priority in the pohcies of iill Soviet leaders."** In addition to answering the question of how society should be organized, conununism advocated die destruction of ill! religion. Within the logic of militant atheism, convinced atlieists were not only the inost politically astute bnt also the most \irtuons individuals.
Consequently, religious groups tended to be vehemently opposed to connnnnist mle becanse tlieir theologies designated a separation of church and state with atheistic communism clearly violatintf this principle. Protestant sects, the Roman Catholic Church, and the 5. Anti-clerical movements throughout Western Europe attacked religious organizations in attempts to expand the doni<un of political ideology into traditionally religious realms, lu late eigliteentb-centur\' France, '•militant republicans argued that the state had a respoiisibilit)-towards its citizens to free them froui lianiiful iniluences: that included a duty to do cvci-y-tliiiit; in its power to uiidenniur the Roman Catholic C^hurch. or even undermine the inHuent-e of religion mure generally. Orthodox Church all initially staged opposition movements with some successes and many failures, ln the case of the Russian Orthodox Church, religions leaders were either executed, disillusioned, or became pawns in tlie communist propaganda system.^ The Roman Catholic Church generated more successful opposition to communist rule in Eastern Europe and at the very least retained some of its antonomy.io Interestingly, Islamic groups generated little opposition to communism. This may come as a surprise for a coupfe of reasons. First, the image of enraged Muslims waging a religious war (the jihad) for pohtical purposes is a common one. Karen Armstrong points out that, in Islam, politics is a matter ol supreme importance, and throughout tlie twentieth century there luis been one attempt after another to create a truly Islamic state. This hits always been difficult. It W;LS an aspiration that refjuircd a jihad, a .struggle that could fiiul no simple t lB ut the anti-religiou.s policies of the Soviet Union produced no jihad in the overwhelmingly Muslim regions of Central Asia. As Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantiil Lemercicr-Quelquejay put it: "apart from a few peasant troubles of no great gra\aty on tlie Mkldle Volga, in Azerbaijan and in Central Asia, the Muslim masses did not rise up in defense of their faith."i2 The absence ol' jihad snegests that Soviet Muslims were unwilling to figlit for thepolitical ideals of their religion. In actuidity, Soviet Muslims did fight for their ideals-^but as with all rehgions, the ideals of Islam are more complex than any popular image of war-mongering Muslims suggest.
Second, Muslims were certiunly numerous enough to wage a massive/'//jrtf/ if they so desired. Changes in the proportion of Muslims in Central Asia mask the fact diat the Muslim population grew throughont the twentieth centuiy. While the Repnblies of C(Mitnil Asia went from 78 percent Mushm in 1926 to 55 percent in 1965, this decrease rellects the number of Russians and other Eastern Europeans who were moved into the various Centnil Asian Republics to farm, work in and manage flictories, and administer public offices and schools.'••* Nevertheless, tiie ntunber of Muslims in Ontral Asia grew from around 10.5 million to 16 million over forty years (see Table 1 ). In fact, Muslims had the highest birth rate of any group in the Soviet Union.14 So while their proportion within Centra! Asia was decreasing dne to the in-rnigration of non-Muslims, their proportion within the Soviet Union was increasing due to higher Muslim fertility'. The growth of the Muslim population all over the Soviet Union was such that Soviet demographers actually feared tbat the Soviet Union would become a Musliin-inajorit)' nation by the twenty-first centurv. Much has been made of the fact that Islam Is not only a religion but also a political doctrine. This stems from the origins of the religion and the distinguished tiilents and vision of Muhammad, who excelled as prophet, military general, and civic leader. As Mircea Eliade notes.
The histor\' ot religions and universal history know of no enterprise comparable to that of iMuhammad. The conquest of Mecca and the foundation of a theocratic state proved that his political genius was not inferior to his religious genius.1''
Muhammad created an extensive Islamic connnunity governed by rehgious law-an ideal that would forever intertwine politics and religion within the doctrine of Islam.
In contrast, no similar theocratic ideal exists in the history of Christianity. Early Christianity grew into an extensive network of religiovis communities which were later embraced by the Roman Empire. Since the initial rise of Christianit)', Christian institutions were independent of state govennnent, producing a clmrch-state relationship in which religious and political spheres were autonomous even while becoming mutually dependent.
The medieval church-state arrangement and the modem idea of a secular state that is religiously neutral were hotli the results of working compromises. The more reasonable uniong the partisans of pope and emperor, ju.st as the later the more reasonable C'atliolics and Protestants, seeing that doctrinal purity and logical consistency spelled continued strife, settled for a nebulous but manageable middle ground between the extremes. ^D octrinal competition between Christianity and Enropean rnlers' claims to legitimacy were sufficienUy resolved through an understanding of separate vet symbiotic spberes of influence. This relationship was also thcofogically justified within Christian scriptnre, often referred to as the doctrine of "two swords." As the Apostle Paul explains in Romans, Let every* person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those tbat exist have been instituted by God. Because Soviet communism preached a decidedly anti-Western doctrine, it had an interesting appeal to Muslims who were displeased with the imperialism of Westem empires. Of course, communism was also anti-religious. Nevertheless, the civil war which followed the Russian Revolution placed Bolsheviks in no position to wage a war against Islam in central Asia. Therefore, Bolsheviks attempted to appeal to Muslims as allies by promising them political independence and religious freedom.25 In fact, Lenin profes.sed an admiration for Muslims who had revolted against imperialism and saw many Islamic folk heroes as einblematic of the hnman struggle agiiinst oppression. This annotincenieiit did not go unread. In communism, many Muslims saw the possibility of Islam once again becoming a powerful force in a world that appeared to be leaving them behind.
An influential t^roiip of Mnshm elites often labeled "national communists" seizett the opportunity handed tliem by the Soviets and attempted to influence the changing Dolitical tide of Ccntnil Asia ratlier than be washed away by it. These forward-lookitig Islamic tiiinkers attempted to "rationalize Islam, to purifv it and bring it into line with the modem era."2« Leading historical scholars on Islam in tht; Soviet Union, Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelqnejay, summarize the characteristics of this group as follows:
They were, generally speaking, sincere Mai-xists who, to hegin with, accepted without reservation the progrannne ofthe Bolshevik Communist Part)' hut remained none the less deeply imhued with the nationalist ideal. . . . Within Marxist doctrine, they t(X)k their pick of ideas and methods, selecting tlio.se that were in keeping with thdr particular need; that is to say, those which could substantiate their case for a more radical stniggle witli tlie West and an acceleration of the pace of refonn in Muslim society. . . . The Moscow government gave them its blessing, regarding them as a necessary 'huffer' between central power and the native population, and hoping that it would be able, in tlie long term, to re-educate them.29
Re-education of this group wonld entail the dissipation ot nationalist feivor and the eradication of religious culture. But the Soviets wonld never successfully disentangle Islam from Marxism in the Mnslim Republics. In fact, many Mushms would come to view connnnnism as a form of Islam thronghout the Soviet era; as one Muslim dignitarv' pointed out in 1970 at an international conference, "Soviet leaders' wiio believe neither in God nor his Prophet nevertheless apply laws that were dictated by God and expounded by his Prophet."30 Sultan Galiev was the intellectual leader ofthe national communists and the highest-ranking Mushm in the Communist Partv between 1920 and 1923. As a leading advisor to Stalin, Gdiev argued that in Islamic regions "we need to say openly, to whom it is appropriate, that we are in no way fighting against any religion, we are only conducting 27 propaganda ior our atheist convictions, exercising our right to do so."3i But in additir)n to advocating religions tolerance. Galiev made a more dangerous political move in advocating an independent connnunist state in Central Asia. In 1918, Galiev wrote that "we must tmite the Muslim masses in a conninmist movement that shall be our own and autonomous."32 This placed Soviets in a ditfknlt position; a gntssroots communist movement was (K-cniring within Central Asia but was taking on a natiouiilist and Islamic spirit referred to as "Sultan Galiyevism."
By By killing off many leading Muslims coinnnniists, Stalin created a political dilemma. Replacing Muslim commimist leaders widi Russian communists would msnre that Islamic nationansni would not impact commnnist ideolojn-in Centra! Asia, hut loyal Russian commnnists were mgeiitlv nee(Ied in the newly formed Russian Republic aiul few had knowledge of" the Islamic society the\' would be asked to mle. Nevertheless, many elite positions in central Asia were given to Russians. Rut MnsHm communists were still needed to ad\ise these leaders and often held leadersliip positions themselves, The Board of Muslims was created for the ediiication of Russian communists concerning Islamic soc-iety and many Cx)mmuiiist Part)' members in central Asia were .self-identiiied Muslims: in 1918, one-half of the Communist !*arty of Turkestan was Muslim and in 1924, the Bukhara Communist Partv" was 70 jiercent Muslim.^"^ Under these eirenmstances, Soviet elites hacl to come to tenns with the fact that Muslim communists were a reality that could not be wholly eliminated. While Muslims of Centnd Asia were certainly denied national antonomy nnder commnnism. many of the initiiil goals of \Sultan Galiyevism" came to fruition. Muslim coinmnnists had wanted to liKxleniize Central Asia and Soviet Russia was providing them with the resonrces to do it. Tiierefore, Islamic nationalism did not antomatically find itsell omwsed to commnnist interests. In contrast, nationalism throtighout Eastern Europe was at odds vvitli the communist agenda irom the beginning and developed into the main expression ofatiticommunist convictions. This is mainly dne to the fact tliat Eastern Europe was more indnstriali/.ed than Central Asia; conseqnently, communists souglit different goals in these regions. Eastern European communists wanted to unite the proletariat of all coniitiies and sliift the control of industry into tfie luuids of its workers. Bnt Central Asia had no iiidustr\ to speak of and Muslim comunmists hoped to indnstrialize tiieir regions in order to "eatch np" to tiieir westem connterparts.
The act of modenii/.ing Islamic society was closely linked to its empowerment in the world economy and tlterefore communism hecame an nnintended means to realize this pre-exi.sting nationalist goid. Unlike Chri.stian c'liiirclu's in Eastern Europe which deniunded an exciusive nieuibership that could not l)e reconciled with ('onnnnnist Party nieinl)ership, nianv Muslim leaders viewed participation in conniinnist antl even atheist organizations iis a way to strengthen Muslim power.
In line witli Mnslini nationalist goals, Soviet.s offered something which had not previously been available to Muslims-free pnbhc education ou a massive scale. At the eutl of the Tsarist regime less thau three thou.saud Miisliiii children attended pul)lic school, but the Soviets prioritized the educatiouiil system to the extent that In' 1921 over 84,(M)0 Mushui children were enrolled in .state public schools.-" In time, all Muslim children attended free Soviet schools and by most aceouuts received iustmctiou siniiliii" to that oi more modeniized regions of the Soviet Union.
Muslims certainly took advantage of the educational opportiuiities offered by the Soviet goveniment. O-ntral Asians were some of the least educated people in the Soviet Union in the 192{)s, but bv the 195()s thcv' were receiving secondarv edncations at a rate compara[)le to the other Soviet ropnblies (see Table 2 ). Tbe relationship be^veen Islam and communism was a grttwing process of give and take. Muslim leaders saw tbe long-term advantages of modernization and Central Asia quicklv became the most tecbnologically advanced region in the Islamic world." But while many Muslitns sought entrv' into the economic and political structure created by the So\iet Union and succeeded in becoming part of the ruling and educated ehte, they were simultaneously losing tbeir Islamic traditions. In 1929, the Soviet Union passed the "Law on Religious Associations" which outlined bow state officials were to monitor and control all religious groups. In Central Asia, comnuniists dissolved all Islam courts; these courts oversaw criitiinai justice bv upbolding hoth customary law {'adat) and Koranic law (Shariah). Bemiigsen and Leniercier-Quelquejay point out tliat tbis assault was relatively easy becau.se it was supported by Muslim elites who \iewetl the So\iet reform as "merely one more engagement in the long war o\ ihv jadids to modeniize the juridical structure of Islam."-''' In tbis case, tbe communist anti-Islamic policv realized what some Islamic nationalists had hoped to accomplish as long ago as the early nineteenth century. While tbe toss of Islamic cotirts was clearly not supported by iill Mushms, it is important to note that some Islamic thinkers saw communism as a means to settle centuries-long conflicts within tlie Finally, Soviets attempted to alter the Islamic clan stnicture at tbe village level. Tbe extended patriarclud stnicture of Islamic famihes throughout central Asia was cniciii! in the transmission of local customs and daily rituals. Maniages were largely arranged and married women were sent to live with the families oF tbeir hus-bands. Resources were shared within this family unit with tbe eldest male overseeing tbe distrtbution and application of finances. The introduction of communism to local regions had mixed success in altering this family .system. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quekjuejay explain:
The Soviet regime struck heavily at the large joint family, causing it to lose all economic significance. In spite of that, this type of family survived . . . in a modified form but still preserving its traditional characteristics in the formerly nomad districts.
Here the large joint family persists more as an ethical than as a functional unit, in the sense that a number of customs survive despite prohibitions; but these are nevertheless gradually disappearing. ^2
The massive in-mieration of non-Muslims also impacted the Islamic family system simply by introducing Muslims to new levels of ethnic and religious diversity. Tbe 1959 Soviet census shows diat the percent of interfaith maniages (which they call "mixed" marrtages) in central Asian Republics was (juite high, between 14 to 18 percent of the population in urban centers (see Table 4 ). The number of iuterfaith marriages indicates tbat local Islamic customs were commonly broken by tbe 1950s and the tradidoiiid Islamic family system was in crisis. In Central Asia under Soviet mle, the term "Muslim" became largely a point of reference for communal identity, but wbose speeincally religions essence for many nominal Muslims when used duriug this era. Bnt nnicb die same could be said of being "Catholic" in Poland or "Orthodox" in Russia, the Ukraine, and Befanis: these terms were, and to a significant degree still are, used to evoke uatiouiU and etlinic identities in these regions.^^ But strictly speaking, a communist in Poland conld not be a Catholic, and a communist in Russia was not also Orthodox. This important difference between the persistence of religious identifiers under conunnuism depends mainly on theological differences between Christianity and Islam.
Because Islam dealt with severe persecution in the past, tbere are specific rehgious niles regarding now Muslims should react to religiously hostile environments.
Normally, individuals are recpiired to l()llow tbe five "pillars" {rukns) of Islam in order to be Muslims; however, these retjuirernents can be waived under special circumstances. Within lands of religious warfare, it is accepted tbat a believer may not practice Islamic rituals or customs because doing so would endanger tneinselves. As Bennigsen and Leniercier-Quelquejay explain: common, and that Islam, like Judaism, is a religion where tlie part played hy spiritual leaders and religious institutions is only secondar)-, and tiierefore it is better able than Christianity to resist outside pressure.56
Of special interest is that tliis t}'pe of Islam is theologically considered a form of resistance. By giving up religious obsen ance the Muslim can retain his or her faith in secret and thereby withstand the extermination of Islamic belief Darl ul harb became a reid and popular option for Central Asian Muslims wbo were predominiuitiy Sunni Muslims of tbe Ilanafi School. This school represents one of the most hberal religious orientations within Islam. Melirdad Ilaebavetlbi explains:
Several Hanafi principles have heen instnimental in providing a fle)d[)le framework for the practice of I.slani, hence offering more freedom to the Central Asian believer. First, and perhaps the most critical aspect, is the qualitative distinction that has been made between fiiith (iman), and work or practice (amal). The Hanafis argvic that if a Muslim wholeheartedly believes in God and the pmpliethood of Muhammad, but Is negligent in performing his religious duties, he is not an infidel.''^'' Through tbis theological distinction between faith and practice, religion can easily remain personal and internal and never needs to mauifest itself as a sociid or political movement. In Central Asia, Soviet olficials destroyed tbe institutional basis of Islam without opposition, but Hanafi Muslims claim to have retained their religious integrity in dar-ul harb, where religions expression is wholly unobservable and exists only in the heart of tlie individual.
Tbis fact makes tbe doctrine of Islam very different from most Christian theologies. Islam "depends less for its survival on tbe regular conduct of religious ceremonial worship by qualified clergy than the various (^Ibristian sects."•^^ The theological system of Islam provides inucli greater freedom to religious believers to privately proclaim fmth without relying on professional clergy or a system of rituals to validate it. In contrast, the Roman Catlumc Church and Orthodox Church must sanction rituals and rites pertornied in its name. But Muslim communities tbroughout central Asia were theologically free to improvise and create local solutions to get iiround government regulations on religion. Let me mention some of tbe more common occurrences.
Officially, mosques were closed in great numbers throughout central Asia. But unofficial mosques were consistently created and maintained in villages.
Often old or condemned nios(|ues were utilized in place of officially closed mosqiies which were fre({uently reoccupied for use by coininnnist officials.
Another religions space utilized by Mushms is called a "mazar," a gravesite or tomb often marked by piling stones into pyramid shapes. Interestingly, mazars are often "delinerately made to look neglected so tbat local officials (financial inspectors are especially feared) will take tbe lnazar to be nou-functioning."59 Keller compiled a detailed list of unregistered houses of prayer in 1936 from local records throughout central Asia.^o Her results show a tremendous number of unregistered mosques in both niral and urban areas (see Table 5 ). Keller notes the many limitations of her data and one can assume that more unregistered nioscjues existed tban were recorded. Nevertheless, tbe fact that the number of both registered and unregistered mosques in 1936 is a fraction of tbe number of mosques in existence before 1917 indicates that unofficial mosques conkl not fully replicate the extensiveness of Islamic houses of prayer in piecommunist times. Of course, further closures of mosques occurred after 1936; tbe most drastic assault happened under Kbnishehev when 3,567 nios(jues (mostly unregistered) were closed between 1961 and 1963 iu Uzbekistan alone.f^' Therefore, one can assume that many Muslim communities went without mosques or houses of prayer during tbe communist era.
Unofficial number of regi.stered and unregistered iinauis and mullalis.^s Mere slie does not provide a comparison to pre-communist times but one gets a clear sense of liow greatly unofficial clerey outnumbered official clergy (see Table 6} . Unofficial clergy were often young students or conversely retirees from traditional clerical families but "the majority of snch mullalis did not know dogma, the canonically approved rituals', or tlic prayers [of Islam]. . . ."6N evertheless, Poliakov argues that these untrained clergy served "Islam very well on the daily level, because they know ver\' well what their people need.''^'* While it seems possible tliat the spiritual needs of Mnshms were being served on some level, the Islamic character of this spiritualism is unclear. In an ironic twist, the League of Militant Atheists in Tashkent actntilly wanted to translate the Koran into Uzbek so that more Mnshms would know the Koran so that they could subsequently be shown its fallacies.^5 Therefore, the success of communism might be measured in terms of how many atheists it eould produce. This is a tricky outcome to assess in Central Asia for a number of reasons.
The Soviet League of Mihtant Atheists reported tens of thousands of members in the Central Asian Republics in tlie 1930s and a miraculous growth rate comparable to other Soviet republics.^^ But these reports are highly unreliablet^« and the League of Militant Atheists was rendered defunct by 1940. Independent reports show that the proportion of atheists in Central Asia by 1970 are equal to that of the Soviet Union as a whole (see Figure 3) but there is no way to determine if these atheists were ethnically Russian, Ukrainian, or native to Oiitrai Asia. • 1 1 Second, Mushms were not willing to (hsovvn their religious members for publicly advocating atheism. As one committed Kazakh communist explained, "1 uiri an atheist hut also a Mushm, because all Kazakhs are Mushms and I cannot deny my forefathers."70 Consecmently, the Leagne of Militant Atheists faced an opponent that refused to fight with Muslims willing to acc;ept atheisTii but unwilling to attack Islam. Iu fact, the phenouienon of trie "non-believing Muslim" is reported to be widespread in Soviet publications."^i But this phenomenon is difficult to explain. It is uot clear that Mushms were as iniicli "non-believers" as they were willing to reconcile the doctrine of atheist communism with the idea of Islam. Uzbek scholar, Tolib Saidbayev, argues that under communism Mushms lived in "two dimensions: 'in the one, relating to the public sphere. Central Asians were thoronglily Sovietized in their attitudes, values and loyalties; in the other, relating to the private st)here, they retained a largely traditional outlook, their world shaped^ by customs and preconceptions that were rooted in Islamic practice. ' Under these circninstancfs, it appears that atheistic comnninism and Islam were actually reconciled or at least were expanded to produce a new form of Islamic communism. This reconciliation was not pennittcd by the Orthodox or Roman Catholic churches, even though .some members of these religions certainly collaborated with communists. In contrast, Islam in Central Asia placed fewer restrictions on the believer than mainstream Christian institntions. Both the Roman Catholic and Orthodox CJhurch demand membership and attendance for religious inclusion and viewed communist organizations as competing for the loyalty of its members. In addition, the hierarchical structure of tlie Roman Catholic and OrtluHlox Church were imeasy with tlie activities of "undcrgronnd" religions movements which did not consult with an official religious representative. Within these religious traditions, secrecy could potentially he considered heresy. In the case of Czech Catholic Church, the fact that underground priests married led to their eventual exconmumication.'a Due to the theologv' of Islam, covert religions practice or even a lack of religions practice is acceptable as long as tiie iutlividual privately believes in Allah.
In Islam, the means ot crossing the boundary from non-Islam to Islam is relatively straight-forvvartl: through the shaliada or the profession of iiiith that There is no god but Cod. and Muhammad is the messenger of Cod,' This lirst pillar of the Islamic liiitb is the mond equivalent ol a public declaration ctelimitiiig the borders of one's tuiiid.^T herefore, Muslims felt no theological dilemma in worshiping in private in non-officiiil mosques and with non-official clerics ana olten improvised with tlie content ofthe rituals. These doctriiuil differences between Christianity and Islam provide a key insight into religious persistence under connnunism. Overall, Islam was less competitive tfian Christianity with conmumism; in other words, it more easily reconciled itself to' the religious and political demands of communism. Without active competition between the doctrines of Ishun and commnnism, religious and an ti-religious fervor was less appareut throughout central Asia. Many Muslims lispassionately admitted to being atheists and many Communist Party members openly retained their Muslim identity. This produced an ideological randscape with no clear victors. Soviet atheists were unable to disrupt stronCT ties to Islam even amongst leading commnnists in central Asia. And while Mnslim identity resoTntcly persisted throughout the communist era, Islam entered a \ong jahiliyija-the Mushm term for an era of rehgious ignorance. Decades of covert Islamic activitv led to a re-emergence of pre-Islamic svnihols and spirituiil beliefs as untrained clergy improvise from a limited knowledge oi' their religious h('ritage.77 In many ways mioffieial Islam resembled indigenous folk religions and the Islamic schoUu-Sluirin Akiner'^s even asserts that during Soviet mle "scarcely anybodv, other than the niania and religious truiuees, knew evtMi the basic Mu.slim attestation oi' faith: There is no God but God, and Muhannned is His Prophet."' In the end, the Soviet era produced an nnusual mix of estranged Muslims and religious commnnists woven into an ideological braid which, years after tile lidl oi tile Soviet Union, is still iu the process of unraveling. many of tlu* social programs implemented by Soviets fit tlieir preexisting nationalist goals. This further helped to solidify-a working relatio!iship hetween Mnslims and atheistic coininuiiists. No similar relationship developed between communists and Chri.stians in Russia and Eastern Enrope; in fact, Soviet conmninism began its occnnancy in many Christian regions by actively assanlting the local chnrclies and religious leaders. But within central Asia, Soviet communists lirst appealed to the interests of Mnslinis before later attacking their traditional religious institutions.
Beyond tiie.se initial political and economic differences, Muslims also (dffer from Christians in terms of how they understand their religion and their religions identities. The doctriue of Islam is more tlexil)le in terms of how it defines tme believers than most Christian chnrches. Consecjuently, Mnslims more easily practiced their religious ritnals in private and even more commonly relinquished their religious practices with the imderstandiug that their religious convictious were known to Allah, the delining characteristic of being Mnslini.
Tiie case of Soviet Mnslinis appears confusing at first gUmce. Islani is a cluster of religious doctriues witii political aspirations and Soviet commnnism was decidedly atheistic. Therefore, Islam and So\-iet commuuisni were quite natnral enemies. Nevertheless, the fact that Muslims tended to acconnuodate and sometimes foster Soviet communism demonstrates tlie importance of both politic^il and religions goals to Central Asians. First and foremost, many Muslims saw political and economic advantages to Soviet communism while Christian groups tended to suffer losses in botli politictil and economic strength. Second, Christian groups expected members to miike a choice between the advantages of participating with the Soviet system or remaining faithful to their religious tradition. In contrast, certain theological elements witliin Islam alk)wed Mnslims to both participate in the project of Soviet communism and remain faithful Mnsfims. Therefore, Soviet Muslims accommodated the strictures of atheistic communism more easily than Christians because they were politically and theologically distinctive.
